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I. Introduction 
Because the preceding edition of this publication did not 
contain an article on trends in commercial transactions or 
consumer protection in California, this article will discuss 
selected decisions and developments in those fields during the 
years 1968 and 1969.1 The principal focus of this article 
will be the significant decisions made during this period that in-
terpret or relate to the principal statutes in the two fields: the 
California Commercial Code,2 the Rees-Levering Automobile 
Sales Finance Act, and the Unruh Retail Installment Sales 
Act. These legislative enactments establish a comprehensive 
statutory pattern for regulation of all aspects of commercial 
law in this state. 
1. Due to publication deadlines, no 
decisions subsequent to October 1, 
1969, are included within the scope of 
this article. It should also be noted 
that the article's scope does not in-
clude a discussion of federal statutes 
that affect commercial activity within 
this state. Thus, the Truth-In-Lending 
Act (Public Law 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 
15 U.S.C.A. 1601 et seq.) and its signifi-
cance is omitted from discussion. The 
interested reader is referred to the al-
ready voluminous literature on this sub-
ject, including: Butler, Truth and Con-
fusion in Lending, 55 American Bar 
Assn. Journal 27 (Jan., 1969); Barrett, 
An Introduction to Truth in Lending, 
14 Practical Lawyer 83 (Dec., 1968); 
and Attorney's Guide to Truth in Lend-
ing, California Continuing Education of 
the Bar (1969). 
Also beyond the scope of this arti-
cle are the substantial number of Cali-
fornia decisions concerning real prop-
erty transactions and secured interest 
in real estate, including Connor v. 
Great Western Saving & Loan Associa-
tion, 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 
(1968) and Hellbaum v. Lytton Sav-
ings & Loan Association, 274 Cal. App. 
2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (June, 1969). 
444 
2. The Uniform Commercial Code, 
commonly known as the V.C.C., was 
enacted with numerous amendments in 
1963 by the California legislature, and 
became effective on January 1, 1965. 
The California version of the U.e.C. is 
commonly known, and will be referred 
to in this article, as the California Com-
mercial Code or Cal. Com. Code. The 
official text of the V.C.e. was accom-
panied by the comments of its drafters, 
and the California Commercial Code is 
similarly interpreted with the aid of 
the California Code Comments. Here-
after, references to the two commentar-
ies will be made as V.C.C. Comment to 
(e.g.) section 3419, or Cal. Code Com-
ment to (e.g.) section 415. The two 
sets of Comments can be found in Deer-
ing's Annotated Commercial Code im-
mediately following the section to 
which they relate. 
For a reason unknown to the author, 
the California legislature, in enacting 
the California Commercial Code, chose 
to label the nine major sections of the 
code as Divisions, whereas the V.e.C. 
labels the same nine major sections as 
"Articles." Thus Division 2 of the 
California Commercial Code is the en-
actment, with some amendments, of 
Article 2 of the U.e.e. 
CAL LAW 1970 
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The amendatory activity of the state legislature, which was 
a principal subject of Professor Levy's article on Commercial 
Transactions in the 1967 edition of this publication,3 vir-
tually ceased in the years 1968 and 1969 with regard to the 
California Commercial Code. However, as will be hereafter 
noted, the California legislature has been quite active in re-
gard to the Rees-Levering and Unruh Acts. In general, the 
case law development regarding these three statutes has been 
beneficial during the years in question, and a number of dif-
ficult decisions, particularly in the field of negotiable instru-
ments, have been determined by the Courts of Appeal. The 
primary contribution of the California Supreme Court during 
this period was a single decision, the importance of which can 
hardly be overstated. This article concludes with an extended 
discussion of that decision, Morgan v. Reasor/ and the opin-
ion rendered therein by Justice Tobriner. 
II. California Commercial Code 
A. Liabilities of Banks in Paying or "Cashing" Checks 
The attention of the courts of this state was often directed, 
during 1968 and 1969, to the subject of the liability of banks 
in dealing with their customers and persons to whom their cus-
tomers have issued checks. While the California Commercial 
Code contains various sections that deal with this subject, 6 
the cases under discussion here presented fact situations that 
are not resolved by the explicit terms of the code. As used 
in this discussion, the term "drawee bank" refers to the bank 
on which the check in question has been drawn,6 and the term 
"collecting bank" refers to any bank other than the drawee 
bank that has handled the check.7 Usually, the collecting 
bank is the first bank to which a check is transferred in the 
collection process; in layman's terms, the bank in which the 
3. See Levy, COMMERCIAL TRANS-
ACTIONS, Cal Law-Trends and Devel-
opments 1967, pp. 47, 76. 
4. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 
447 P.2d 638 (1968). 
CAL LAW 1970 
5. See divisions 3 and 4 of the Cal. 
Com. Code. 
6. See Cal. Com. Code § 4105(b) and 
U.C.c. Comment 2 to that section. 
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check is "cashed." In the sense that the word is used both 
in this article and in the code, only the drawee bank can "pay" 
a check, since it is the only bank that is ordered to make such 
a "payment" by the terms of the check.s 
In Indiana Plumbing Supply Company v. Bank of America,9 
the Court determined that a joint payee on a check whose 
indorsement is forged by a fellow joint payee in cashing the 
check has a cause of action against the collecting bank to re-
cover the amount of the check.lO The Court adopted the rea-
soning and resolution of the issue previously announced in 
Harry H. White Lumber Co. v. Crocker Citizens National 
Bank.ll Both decisions declare that the precode California 
case law permitted such a recovery, and that the code contains 
no indication that the prior California rule is altered in any 
way.12 Courts in other jurisdictions have also reached the 
related conclusion that nothing contained in the Uniform 
Commercial Code controls on the liability of a collecting bank 
that has cashed a check on a forged indorsement to the drawer 
of the check.13 It is worth noting in this context that at least 
some commentators feel that the code did effect a change in 
the prior California law in giving the payee a direct right of 
action against the drawee bank that pays a check on a forged 
indorse men t.14 
Another major question relating to a collecting bank's lia-
bility when it cashes a check on a forged indorsement is un-
resolved by the code. The question is whether the drawer 
of the check can assert a direct cause of action against the col-
lecting bank that cashed the check on the basis of the forged 
indorsement. By way of background, it is clear that the payee 
8. While the word "pay" is not de-
fined in the code, this is the obvious 
meaning given to the word by the stat-
ute. See Cal. Com. Code §§ 3401(1) 
(b), 3104 (2)(a), (b). 
9. 255 Cal. App.2d 910, 63 Cal. 
Rptr. 658 (1967). 
10. 255 Cal. App.2d 910, 915, 63 
Cal. Rptr. 658, 660-661 (1967). 
11. 253 Cal. App.2d 368, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. 381 (1967). 
446 
12. 255 Cal. App.2d 910, 915, 63 
Cal. Rptr. 658, 660-661, and 253 Cal. 
App.2d 368, 376, 61 Cal. Rptr. 381, 
386 (1967). 
13. Stone & Webster Engineering 
Corp. v. First National Bank & Trust 
Company, 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 
358, 361, 99 A.L.R.2d 628 (1962). 
14. See California Code Comment 3 
to Cal. Com. Code § 3419. 
CAL LAW 1970 4
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of the forged check may sue either the drawee bank or the col-
lecting bank.ls It is also clear that the drawee bank cannot 
charge the drawer's account after paying the forged check.16 
If the drawee bank cannot charge the drawer's account, it 
would appear to be saddled with the loss. However, in such 
a situation, the code established the right of the drawee bank 
to recover the amount of the check from the collecting bank 
on the theory that the collecting bank has breached its war-
ranty of the validity of all indorsements necessary to give it 
"good title.1ll7 
None of the liabilities and rights of action mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph, considered individually, resolves the is-
sue of the drawer's right of action against the collecting bank. 
Further complicating the matter is the fact that the drawee 
bank's liability to the drawer for paying a check on a forged 
indorsement is subject to a time limitation. The drawer must 
examine his checks and report the forgery to the drawee bank 
within 1 year from the time he receives the bank statement 
and canceled check. Failure on the drawer's part to report the 
forgery within 1 year bars him, pursuant to section 4406 ( 4 ) 
of the code, from suing the bank.ls The public policy in favor 
of prompt examination of bank statements and canceled 
checks to discover forgeries supports the imposition of the 
section 4406( 4) requirements.19 
It is obvious that permitting a drawer to sue the collecting 
bank directly avoids circuity of actions, a wholly worthwhile 
goaPO However, a drawer, barred by the limitations period 
15. See Cal. Com. Code § 3419(1)(c) 
in regard to the drawee bank's liability 
in such a situation, and the discussion 
of Indiana Plumbing Supply Co. v. 
Bank of America, supra, concerning the 
collecting bank's liability. 
16. See discussion of Wright v. Bank 
of California, infra. 
17. See Cal. Com. Code § 4207(1)(a). 
18. See Cal. Com. Code § 4406(4). 
The official text of the V.C.C., on the 
other hand, would allow the drawer to 
CAL LAW 1970 
report the forgery to the drawee bank 
within a 3-year period. 
19. See V.C.c. Comment 7 to Cal. 
Com. Code § 4406. 
20. Two recent cases demonstrate 
the salutary effect of the statutory 
codification of the law regarding the 
banking process in division 4 of the 
California Commercial Code. By rely-
ing on the well-drawn definitions of 
such terms as "collecting bank" and 
"documentary draft," two recent Cal-
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established in section 4406 ( 4) from an action against the 
drawee bank, might be able to circumvent the statutory policy 
encompassed in this section if he is entitled to sue the collect-
ing bank. A concern for this aspect of the problem led the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to deny the drawer 
a right of recovery based on a conversion theory against the 
collecting bank in Stone & Webster Engineering Corp. v. First 
National Bank & Trust Company.l 
In July, 1969, the Court of Appeal rendered the first de-
cision in this state subsequent to the passage of the California 
Commercial Code on the liability question. 2 In Allied Con-
cord Financial Corporation v. Bank of America,3 the Court, 
concluding that the enactment of the code provided an oppor-
tunity to consider the liability issue on a new basis, held that 
the drawer was entitled, on third-party beneficiary principles, 
to the benefit of the warranties of proper indorsement that the 
collecting bank makes by implication to the drawee bank.4 
complex fact situations in a clearly cor-
rect manner. (See Frontier Refining 
Co. v. Home Bank, 272 Cal. App.2d 
630, 77 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1969), which 
applied the definition of "collecting 
bank" at Cal. Com. Code § 4105(d), 
and Valenzuela v. Bank of America, 
272 Cal. App.2d 673, 77 Cal. Rptr. 
609 (1969), in which the Court applied 
the definition of "documentary draft" 
as defined in Cal. Com. Code § 4104(f), 
in decisions exonerating the banks in-
volved from liability.) At least on the 
evidence of these two decisions, the op-
timistic belief of the drafters of Article 
4 of the U.C.C. that a codification of 
the rules regulating this complex and 
often arcane area would greatly benefit 
the banking industry, the commercial 
bar, and the courts, seems justified. 
(See U.C.C. Comment to Cal. Com. 
Code § 4101. Article 4 of the U.c.e. 
was, of course, enacted, with some 
amendments to conform with existing 
California banking practice, as Division 
4 of the Cal. Com. Code.) Article 4 
was designed by its drafters to replace 
448 
the American Bankers Association Bank 
Collection Code, several "deferred post-
ing" statutes, and decisional law in the 
various states. (See U.C.C. Comment 
to Cal. Com. Code § 4101.) In Cali-
fornia, the adoption of article 4 re-
placed Financial Code sections 1010-
1019. These former sections of the 
Financial Code constituted one of the 
few comprehensive state bank collec-
tion statutes. (See Introductory Com-
ment to division 4 of the Cal. Com. 
Code.) 
1. 345 Mass. 1, 184 N.E.2d 358, 
361, 99 A.L.R.2d 628 (1962). 
2. The precode rule in California had 
been that the drawer had no right of 
action against the collecting bank. See 
California Mill Supply Corp. v. Bank 
of America, 36 Ca1.2d 334, 223 P.2d 
849 (1950); Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. San Francisco Bank, 58 
Cal. App.2d 528, 136 P.2d 853 (1943). 
3. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
622 (1969). 
4. See 275 Cal. App.2d -, -, 80 
Cal. Rptr. 622, 624. 
CAL LAW 1970 
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The decision, for support, notes that the West Virginia Su-
preme Court recently resolved the same issue in a similar 
fashion. 5 
On the issue that had troubled the Massachusetts Court in 
Stone & Webster, supra, the Court of Appeal resolved the 
question by imposing the I-year statute of limitations con-
tained in section 4406 ( 4) on any action that the drawer might 
bring against the collecting bank relating to a forged indorse-
ment.6 Thus, the Court gives the collecting bank the advan-
tages of all the defenses available to the drawee bank in an 
action by a drawer whose account is charged for a check paid 
on a forged indorsement. The Court concludes its decision 
by rejecting the claim of the drawer to a right of action against 
the collecting bank based on a conversion theory.7 The Allied 
Concord decision is clearly correct and constitutes a valuable 
addition to the body of decisions interpreting the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
A related issue came to the attention of the Court in Black-
mon v. Hale. s In that case, the drawer of a check sought 
recovery from the drawee bank for paying a check on which 
"Adams & Hale Trust Account" was the payee. The check 
was indorsed "Adams and Hale Trust Account, by J. C. 
Adams" and "Adams, Hale and Lee Trust Account.,,9 The 
drawer claimed that the check had not been effectively in-
dorsed and that his bank was therefore liable for charging it 
against his account. The Court of Appeal held that the check 
had been validly indorsed because it had the Adams, Hale and 
Lee Trust Account indorsement. Io 
5. Citing Commercial Credit Corp. 
v. Citizens National Bank, 144 SE2d 
784, 788-790, 150 W. Va. 196 (1965). 
6. See 275 Cal. App.2d -, -, 80 
Cal. Rptr. 622, 624-625 (1969). 
7. 275 Cal. App.2d"-, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
622, 625-627 (1969). 
8. 273 A.C.A. 780, 78 Cal. Rptr. 569, 
hearing granted July 30, 1969. After 
this article had been completed, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court handed down a 
CAL LAW 1970 
decision in the case, 1 C.3d 548, 83 Cal. 
Rptr. 194, 463 P.2d 418. 
9. J. C. Adams was an attorney 
whose law firm originally maintained 
the "Adams & Hale Trust Account." 
The firm added Lee and changed its 
trust account designation to "Adams, 
Hale and Lee Trust Account." See 273 
Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 572. 
572. 
10. 273 Cal. App.2d -, 78 Cal. 
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The trial court had concluded that the check was "bearer 
paper," since it was payable to an account and not to an in-
dividual, and thus needed no indorsement for negotiation. 
The reviewing Court rejected this ground on the basis of the 
rule expressed in California Commercial Code section 3110 
(1) (e).l1 The Court went on to state that since Adams was 
the "representative" of the trust account, his indorsement of 
the check, which was "order paper," was an effective indorse-
ment. Unfortunately, some question is raised as to the validity 
of the decision on the basis of the facts stated therein, for 
Adams was not authorized to make withdrawals from the 
trust account on his own signature alone. The signature card 
of the bank that held the trust account required either Hale's 
signature by itself or Adams' and Lee's signature jointly for 
proper withdrawals. Thus, perhaps Adams was not the "rep-
resentative" of the Adams, Hale and Lee Trust Account for 
purposes of section 3110 ( 1 ) ( e ) . However, there is no ques-
tion that the Court's resolution of the "bearer paper" or "order 
paper" issue is correct.12 
The only decision in this area during this period that ap-
pears on its face to be clearly in error was rendered in Septem-
ber, 1969, in the case of Wright v. Bank of California. 13 In 
Wright, the plaintiff, as the result of misrepresentations by 
Feinberg, his cojoint venturer, was induced to write a check 
on the joint venture account in a substantial sum payable to 
March Construction Co. After obtaining the check, Feinberg 
gave it to a confederate who posed as a representative of 
11. Cal. Com. Code § 3110 lists 
those types of instruments that are 
deemed to be "order paper" requiring 
an indorsement for negotiation. Among 
the types of order paper listed are those 
instruments that ". may be 
payable to the order of . . . an 
estate, trust or fund, in which case it 
is payable to the order of the represent-
ative of such estate, trust or fund or 
his successors . . . ." Although § 
3110(l)(e) was not applicable to the 
transaction before the Court, since the 
effective date of the Cal. Com. Code 
450 
was January 1, 1965, and the transac-
tion occurred in 1961, the Court was 
of the opinion that the rule expressed 
therein was sound law and should be 
followed. 
12. The section was intended by the 
U.C.C. drafters to change the law in 
those states that considered checks 
drawn payable to someone other than a 
named individual as "bearer paper." 
See U.C.C. Comment 2 to Cal. Com. 
Code § 3110(2). 
13. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 11 (1969). 
CAL LAW 1970 
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March and took it to the drawee bank. The confederate 
forged an application for a cashier's check payable to March, 
gave the application and the unindorsed check to the drawee 
bank, and received a cashier's check in the same sum as the 
original check, payable to March. Through further efforts, 
Feinberg and his confederate were able to cash the cashier's 
check at a second bank. The drawee bank on the original 
check charged the joint venture account for its amount, and 
Wright sued to have the charge restored. He relied on a num-
ber of theories in his complaint, including negligence, conver-
sion, and a common count for money had and received. 
The trial court upheld the drawee bank's general demurrer 
to the complaint and, although the Court of Appeal reversed 
on other grounds, the appellate decision upheld that trial 
court's determination that the drawee bank incurred no 
liability for the mere act of "paying" the original check 
without reqmnng any indorsement. I4 The reviewing 
Court's reasoning was that whereas negotiation requires an 
indorsement under California Commercial Code section 3202, 
presentment of a check to a drawee bank for payment is an 
act distinct from negotiation. I5 Thus, for effective payment, 
there was no need for the drawee bank to obtain an indorse-
ment of the instrument, and the bank therefore incurred no 
liability when it charged the drawer's account. 
This portion of the Court's opinion is clearly in error. If 
nothing else, the internal inconsistencies in the decision 
demonstrate this fact. In determining, in the second portion 
of the opinion, that the bank may have been negligent in draw-
ing the cashier's check without determining the identity or au-
thority of the applicant, the Court noted that the "fictitious 
payee" rule, which is, in essence, stated in California Com-
mercial Code section 3405, is not applicable as a shield to the 
drawee bank's possible liability for negligence. I6 The Court 
14. The issuing of the cashier's check 16. Cal. Com. Code § 3405(1 )(b) and 
by the drawee bank was clearly "pay- (c) makes an indorsement by any person 
ment" of the original check. in the name of a named payee "effec-
15. 276 Cal. App.2d -, -, 81 Cal. tive" if the drawer of the check, or the 
Rptr. II, 13 (1969). employee of the drawer who supplied 
CAL LAW 1970 451 
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made the determination that section 3405 does not apply, on 
the ground that there was no indorsement on the check.17 The 
Court might well have asked itself why the drawee bank would 
have been protected, if, under section 3405, a forged indorse-
ment would have been "effective." The reason is that with-
out the fictitious payee doctrine, the bank could not legiti-
mately charge the drawer's account, since it is basic negotiable 
instruments law that a drawee bank that pays a check upon a 
forged payee indorsement cannot charge the drawer's ac-
count. 18 This rule is based on the primary duty of a drawee 
bank to pay the check as ordered by the drawer. If the drawee 
bank pays the check to someone other than the actual payee, 
or a subsequent legitimate "holder" of the check, the bank has 
him with the name of the payee, in-
tended the payee to have no interest 
in the instrument. The "fictitious pay-
ee" rule applies to shift the burden of 
loss in situations where a dishonest em-
ployee, with either the authority to 
draw checks on his employer's account 
or to make up such checks for the sig-
nature of a superior, causes the drawing 
of a check payable to a person, fictitious 
or not, whom the dishonest employee 
never intends to receive the check. Af-
ter the check is drawn, the dishonest em-
ployee takes the check to a bank, poses 
as the named payee, forges the named 
payee's signature, and converts the pro-
ceeds of the check to his own use. 
Without the application of the ficti-
tious payee rule, the bank would stand 
the loss in such a situation. This is un-
fair since the employer, by hiring a dis-
honest employee, placed such an em-
ployee in a position to work his mis-
chief. The fictitious payee doctrine, 
as stated in the code, validates the 
forged indorsement. Thus, the bank 
is entitled to charge the employer's ac-
count, and the loss is shifted to the em-
ployer. (See Cal. Code Comment 2 to 
Cal. Com. Code § 3405; Uniform Com-
mercial Code Handbook, American 
Bar Association, pp. 114-116) (1964 
452 
Edition); The Uniform Commercial 
Code, a Special Report by the Cali-
fornia State Bar, 37 Journal of the 
State Bar, PI>. 157-159 (1962), and, 
generally, Abel, The Imposter Payee, 
or Rhode Island was Right, 1940 Wis. 
L. Rev. 161. 
17. 276 Cal. App.2d -, -, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 11, 13-14 (1969). 
18. See The Uniform Commercial 
Code, a Special Report by the Cali-
fonJia State Bar, 37 Journal of the 
State Bar, pp. 155-156 (1962); Britton, 
Bills and Notes, section 142 (1961); 
Security First National Bank of Los 
Angeles v. Bank of America, 22 Ca1.2d 
154, 137 P.2d 452 (1943); Ryan v. 
Bank of Italy, 106 Cal. App. 690, 289 
P. 863 (1930). Although not clearly 
stated in the code, all commentators 
agree that this very basic rule has been 
carried forward under the V.C.C., 
principally in the form of Cal. Com. 
Code § 4401, which authorizes a bank 
to charge a customer's account for 
checks that are "properly' payable." 
See 2 Smith, California Commercia I 
Law, Continuing Education of the Bar, 
section 8.22; Bunn et aI., An Introduc-
tioll to the Uniform Commercial Code 
(1964 Ediiion), pp. 224-225. 
CAL LAW 1970 
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not made payment on the check in accordance with the "or-
der" of the drawer. In Wright, a person posing as the payee 
obtained payment of the check from the drawee bank. Ob-
viously this does not accord with the order of the drawer of 
the check, and the fact that the imposter did not forge the 
payee's indorsement should be of no significance. 
Since the decision in Wright v. Bank of California called for 
a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings, 
the decision, with its glaring error, may remain uncorrected 
for some time until the California Supreme Court has an ap-
propriate opportunity to disapprove or otherwise negate the 
decision.19 
B. Liabilities of Signers of Negotiable Instruments 
During the period under review, California courts rendered 
two noteworthy decisions that may have future significance 
concerning the liability of those who sign negotiable instru-
ments. Twenty years ago, the California Supreme Court, in 
Hamilton v. Abadjian20 announced that courts of this state will 
not lend their process to the collection of gambling debts in 
situations where the debt takes the form of checks cashed by 
casinos to enable customers to gamble. Relying on the rule 
expressed in Hamilton, the Court of Appeal in Lane & Pyron, 
Inc. v. Gibbs l refused to affirm a judgment enforcing the lia-
bility of the drawer of a number of checks payable to Nevada 
gambling casinos on the ground that the trial court record 
contained no substantial evidence showing that the proceeds 
of the checks were not used by the drawer in gambling ac-
tivities at the casinos. The collector-assignee of the checks 
had argued that because the casinos cashed the checks with no 
limitation on where the proceeds could be spent, and because 
the casinos offered a number of goods and services other than 
gambling opportunities, the Hamilton rule should not apply. 
The Court of Appeal disagreed and applied the Hamilton 
19. A petition for rehearing was 20. 30 Cal. 2d 49, 179 P.2d 804 
filed in the case on October 14, 1969, (1947). 
and denied by the Court of Appeal on 1. 266 Cal. App.2d 61, 71 Cal. Rptr. 
October 23, 1969. 817 (1968). 
CAL LAW 1970 453 
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precedent. Although the plaintiff in Lane & Pyron, Inc. was 
not a holder in due course, being merely an assignee for col-
lection, the decision can be fairly read to imply that the re-
sults would be the same even if the plaintiff had been a good-
faith purchaser of the checks without notice of the circum-
stances of their original issue or transfer. Holders in due 
course of negotiable instruments can enforce them against 
drawers or makers without the necessity of meeting so-called 
"personal" defenses such as failure of consideration, nonper-
formance of a condition precedent, etc.2 However, holders 
in due course do take instruments subject to those "real" de-
fenses listed in California Commercial Code sections 3305 
(2) (a) through (e). Among the "real" defenses listed is 
" illegality of the transaction, as renders the obligation 
of the party [meaning the maker or drawer] a nul-
lity. ."3 The judicial attitude reflected in Lane & 
Pyron, Inc., will, it can be assumed, result in future decisions 
holding that a check transaction that produces proceeds 
known by the payee to be earmarked for use in illicit activity, 
be a "real" defense under California Commercial Code sec-
tion 3305(2) (b). 
While noting that the defendant in First Western Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Bookasta4 was not, in the first instance, liable on 
a promissory note made by a corporation on which his signa-
ture did not appear,5 the Court held that if the corporation 
could be shown to be merely the "alter ego" of the defendant, 
the plaintiff would be entitled to enforce the note against him 
on that basis.s This decision opens the door to plaintiffs to 
enforce negotiable instruments according to their terms 
against individuals who use alter ego corporations for business 
purposes. 
2. See Cal. Com. Code §§ 3305 and 5. Citing Cal. Com. Code § 3401(1): 
3306. "No person is liable on an instrument 
3. Cal. Com. Code § 3305(2)(b). unless his signature appears thereon." 
4. 267 Cal. App.2d 910, 73 Cal. 6. 267 Cal. App.2d 910, 914-916, 73 
Rptr. 657 (1968). Cal. Rptr. 657, 659-660 (1968). 
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C. Decisions Interpreting Division 9 
In the period under consideration, the courts demonstrated 
a familiarity and aptitude for working with the provisions of 
Division 9 of the California Commercial Code. Judicial at-
tention to explicit exclusions from the operation of the Divi-
sion and to the definitions of terms set forth in the statute 
produced decisions that are consistent with the statutory pat-
tern. In Morris Plan Company of California v. Moody,7 the 
Court resolved the issues before it by attending to California 
Commercial Code section 9103 ( 4), which establishes that the 
method of perfecting a security interest in motor vehicles is 
governed exclusively by California Vehicle Code sections 
6300 and 6301. In determining the applicability of Division 
9 to security interests in promissory notes that were in turn 
secured by deeds of trust on real property, the Court in Riebe 
v. Budget Financial Corp.8 noted that while Division 9 does 
not apply to liens on real estate,9 the Division does apply to 
security interests in obligations that are, in turn, secured by 
real estate liens.lo 
A federal Court, applying California law, also easily dis-
posed of a case before it by focusing on the precise wording of 
section 9401 ( 1 ) (a) . That section establishes the office of the 
County Recorder in the county of the debtor's residence as the 
proper place for filing a financing statement to perfect a secu-
rity interest in equipment used in farming operations. The 
section, quite correctly, was held applicable to the issue of 
whether a security interest had been perfected in harvesting 
combines used by a "contract harvester" who owned no 
farming property of his own. ll 
7. 266 Cal. App.2d 28, 72 Cal. Rptr. 9. See Cal. Com. Code § 9104(j). 
123 (1968). 10. See Cal. Com. Code § 9102(3). 
8. 264 Cal. App.2d 576, 70 Cal. 11. See Sequoia Machinery, Inc. v. 
Rptr. 654 (1968). Jarrett, 410 F.2d 1116 (1969). 
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III. Consumer Protection 
A. In General 
The Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Ace2 and the 
Unruh Retail Installment Sales Ace3 establish a statutory pat-
tern for the regulation of virtually all consumer sales transac-
tions involving goods or services in the State of California.14 
During the period under investigation, legislative attention 
to these statutes in the politically sensitive consumer protec-
tion area was intense.15 While case law development regarding 
12. Civ. Code §§ 2981-2984.3. 
13. Civ. Code §§ 1801-1812.10. 
14. The Rees-Levering Act, by its ex-
plicit terms, applies only to the sale of 
motor vehicles, whereas the Unruh Act 
controls consumer sales of all other 
"goods," meaning tangible chattels, and, 
with some exceptions, all services. (See 
§§ 1802.1 and 1802.2.) 
15. During the last three years, ap-
proximately 13 additions to or amend-
ments of the Rees-Levering Act have 
been passed by the California legisla-
ture. Some of the more significant 
changes include the addition of section 
2982.1, prohibiting "referral sales" sell-
ing practices in regard to motor vehicles; 
the addition of section 2982.5, regulat-
ing, in some instances, certain aspects 
of "secondary financing" for motor 
vehicle purchases; the addition of sec-
tion 2982.7, requiring the refund of 
down payments made by buyers of mo-
tor vehicles in the event that the pur-
chase contract is not executed; the 
amendment of section 2983 to enable 
the buyer to recover the fair market 
value of his "tradein," or the value as-
signed to it in the motor vehicle pur-
chase contract, whichever is greater, in 
the event that the seller violates certain 
disclosure provisions contained in sec-
tion 2982. 
During the years 1967 through 1969, 
the Unruh Act has been the subject of 
37 amendments, deletions, or additions. 
456 
Among the most significant are the fol-
lowing: the addition of section 1801.4, 
which abrogates a portion of the deci-
sion in Morgan v. Reasor (see extended 
discussion, infra); the deletion from sec-
tion 1803.2 of the requirement that "re-
ferral selling" inducements made to the 
buyer be set forth in the consumer sale 
contract; the repeal of section 1803.9; 
the addition of section 1803.10, pro-
hibiting "referral sales" inducements in 
the sale of consumer goods; the addi-
tion of section 1804.2, which is noted in 
the discussion of Morgan v. Reasor, in-
fra; the addition of section 1812, re-
quiring that an affidavit for a writ of 
attachment obtained in an action en-
forcing a consumer sale contract must 
state facts showing that the suit has 
been commenced in a proper court for 
the trial of the action. (This amend-
ment, effected by Statutes 1969, Ch. 669, 
§ 1, is perhaps of lessened significance 
in the light of the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Snaidach v. 
Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 
337, 23 L.Ed.2d 349, 89 S.Ct. 1820 
(1969), which held prejudgment wage 
garnishments to be violative of proced-
ural due process and the amendment to 
section 1812.10, making the venue re-
quirements for court enforcement of 
consumer sale contracts jurisdictional. 
The Office of the California Attorney 
General issued an opinion in 1968 (51 
Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 179) construing 
CAL LAW 1970 14
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/15
Commercial Transactions 
the Rees-Levering Act was minimal, judicial interpretation of 
the Unruh Act produced the most significant California deci-
sion treated in this article. 
B. The Rees-Levering Act 
During the last two years, a series of five decisions relating 
to the Rees-Levering Act appeared. The cases primarily 
demonstrate application of the terms of the statute. The Court 
in Hughes v. Nashua Manufacturing CO. 16 ruled that a "cutoff" 
clause, by which an automobile purchaser waived any right to 
assert claims he might have against the seller on the condi-
tional sales contract against an assignee of the contract, was 
ineffective because the assignee failed to give the buyer notice 
of the assignment as required by section 2983.5. 17 Although 
a portion of a conditional sales contract covering the sale of 
a vehicle, and many other items, did not comply with section 
2982, the Court in Ryan v. Mike-Ron Corporation18 held that 
the portion of the contract concerning the sale of the motor 
vehicle was severable and that the seller could therefore en-
force the remainder of the contract against the buyer.19 In 
Zmack v. Arata Pontiac,20 the Court affirmed a trial court 
decision of an automobile conditional sales contract on the 
basis of three clear violations of the provisions of section 2982. 
section 1812.10, as it then read, as im-
posing jurisdictional requirements. The 
legislature in 1969 removed any ques-
tion of interpretation on the point by 
adding explicit language to the section. 
Statutes 1969, Ch. 186, § 1.) 
16. 257 Cal. App.2d 778, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 380 (1968). 
17. Section 2983.5 provides that 
written notice of the assignment must 
be given to the buyer by the assignee. 
The buyer then has a 15-day period af-
ter the mailing of the notice in which to 
inform the assignee of any facts giving 
rise to any claim or defense he may 
have against the seller. The section 
provides that if the notice is not given, 
the buyer may assert any right of action 
CAL LAW 1970 
that he has arising out of the contract 
against an assignee of the contract, re-
gardless of the existence of a contractual 
cutoff clause. 
18. 259 Cal. App.2d 91, 66 Cal. Rptr. 
224 (1968). 
19. If a motor vehicle's conditional 
sales contract does not contain the 
items specified in section 2982, the con-
tract is rendered unenforceable against 
the buyer. (See section 2983.) Thus, 
if the buyer chooses, he may rescind 
the contract. Of course, if the buyer 
wishes to keep the motor vehicle, he 
will be liable for the value of the vehi-
cle to the seller. 
20. 265 Cal. App.2d 689, 71 Cal. 
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An automobile lease under which the lessee was to pay rent in 
a sum equivalent to the value of the automobile with a $1 
purchase option at the end of the lease term was denoted a 
conditional sales contract by the Court in Klein v. Leather-
man.1 A buyer who successfully cross complained against 
his seller in an action by the assignee of an automobile con-
ditional sales contract was awarded attorneys' fees as the "pre-
vailing party" pursuant to section 2983.4 in Golden West 
'Credit Corporation v. Maury.2 
C. The Unruh Act and Morgan v. Reasor 
Other than noting two minor decisions, 3 a discussion of 
decisional developments under the Unruh Act must focus on 
the California Supreme Court decision in Morgan v. Reasor 
Corp.4 Because of its direct holdings, discussion of the real-
ities of commercial and consumer financing, and statements 
of judicial attitude and intendments, the decision in Morgan 
is certain to become an oft-cited landmark. 
On October 14, 1962, plaintiffs Morgan agreed to purchase 
a house to be constructed by the predecessor in interest to 
Reasor Corporation on a lot owned by plaintiffs. In connec-
tion with the agreement, the plaintiff buyers executed a con-
tract entitled "Lien Contract and Deed of Trust." By the 
1. 270 Cal. App.2d 792,76 Cal. Rptr. 
190 (1969). The court partially relied 
upon statutory language contained in 
section 2981(a)(2). 
2. 270 Cal. App.2d Supp. 913, 75 
Cal. Rptr. 757 (1969). This decision 
by the Los Angeles Superior Court Ap-
pellate Department relied heavily upon 
Morgan v. Reasor Corp., infra. 
3. People v. George, 257 Cal. App. 
2d 805, 65 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1968), in-
volved a conspiracy conviction of two 
defendants who had engaged in activi-
ties prohibited by section 1812.6 of the 
Unruh Act, which provides that persons 
who wilfully violate the act shaH be 
guilty of a misdemeanor. In James Tal-
cott, Inc. v Gee, 266 Cal. App.2d 384, 
458 
72 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1968), the court re-
jected an argument that the Unruh Act 
applied to the transaction before it. The 
case involved the lease of a printing 
press for use in the lessee's business. 
The court pointed out that the Unruh 
Act, which prohibits deficiency judg-
ments, applies only to credit purchases 
or leases of goods and services for per-
sonal, family, or household use. Thus, 
the lessee businessman was held liable 
for a deficiency judgment on the print-
ing press lease. 
4. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 
447 P.2d 638 (1968). For further dis-
cussion of this case, see Bernhardt, 
REAL PROPERTY, in this volume. 
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terms of this contract, Reasor Corporation sold the labor, 
management, and goods necessary to construct a particular 
model of house on the buyers' property, and the buyers con-
veyed their real property, and subsequent improvements, to 
a trustee, to be held as security until the buyers completed 
payment for the house. At the same time, buyers executed a 
note in favor of the seller, Reasor Corporation, for $19,-
398.12, $11,844 of which represented the cost of the house 
with a "time price differential of $7,554.12."5 The note re-
quired the plaintiffs to make 71 monthly installments of 
$116.06 each, with a final installment of $11,157.86. 
Within three months, seller assigned the contract and note 
to Midwest Homes Acceptance Corporation. Midwest took 
the assignment with knowledge that the note and contract 
arose simultaneously out of the same transaction and with 
full knowledge of all the terms and conditions of the contract 
and note. 
As established by a settled statement of facts entered into 
between the parties for purposes of appeal, the contract and 
the promissory note were at no time encompassed in a single 
document. The contract, at the time of execution by the 
buyers, contained blank spaces that were later filled in with-
out fraudulent intent by either seller or Midwest, and the note 
was undated at the time it was executed by the buyers.6 
The buyers brought up a threshold issue when they sued 
seller and Midwest for, among other things, a declaration 
that they had no liability for the obligation to pay the time-
price differential of $7,554.12, because the above mentioned 
defects were violative of the Unruh Act.7 The defendants 
5. "Time-price differential" was de-
fined in the Unruh Act at § 1802.10 as 
being essentially equivalent to the mean-
ing that a layman gives to the word 
"interest." The phrase was struck 
from § 1802.10 by the 1969 legislature, 
and the phrase "finance charge" was 
inserted as a replacement. This change 
was one of many made in the statute 
by the legislature in order to make 
the terminology of the Unruh Act con-
CAL LAW 1970 
form to that used in the federal Truth-
in-Lending Act. (See footnote on leg-
islative developments, supra.) 
6. The opinion of the Court of Ap-
peal contains the settled statement that 
establishes these facts. Morgan v. Rea-
sor Corp., 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 579-580 
(1968). Final decision 69 C2d 881, 73 
Cal. Rptr. 398, 447 P2d 638. 
7. All three of the "defects" in the 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Commercial Transactions 
argued that the Act was not applicable to the transaction, and 
the alleged defects were therefore of no legal consequence. 
The resolution of this threshold issue by the courts had been 
anticipated by an opinion issued by the California Attorney 
General in 1962.8 That opinion concluded that the labor and 
materials furnished by a general contractor, pursuant to a 
contract to construct a private residence, constituted "serv-
ices" and "goods" as those terms were defined in the Act.9 
The trial court, Court of Appeal, and State Supreme Court all 
reached the same conclusion.lO Although of academic inter-
tive of provisions of the Unruh Act, if 
that statute was applicable. If the note 
and contract arose out of a transaction 
involving "goods" and "services" as de-
fined in sections 1802.1 and 1802.2, the 
act would be applicable, and the re-
quirements of sections 1803.1, 1803.2, 
and 1803.4 would control. Thus, in 
terms of the facts before the court, the 
contract and note violated section 
1803.2 because they were not contained 
in one document, the note would violate 
section 1803.1 because it was undated 
at the time the buyers executed it, and 
the blank spaces contained in the con-
tract when it was signed by the buyers 
would violate section 1803.4. If any 
of the provisons of sections 1803.1, 
1803.2, and 1803.4, or any other sec-
tion in the Act, are violated in a retail 
installment sale covered by the Act, the 
time-price differential cannot be collect-
ed either by the seller, or by a person 
acquiring the rights of the seller through 
assignment or otherwise, who has 
knowledge of the transaction's noncom-
pliance with the Act. (Section 1812.7.) 
Although unmentioned in the State 
Supreme Court decision in Morgan, the 
Court of Appeal's opinion contains ref-
erence to the fact that, by the terms of 
the agreed statement that the parties 
were using for the determination of the 
appeal, the contract and note did not 
provide for a service charge in excess 
of that permitted by the terms of the 
460 
Act. (See 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580.) 
"Servke charge" as defined in section 
1802.10 is synonymous with time-
price differential. The maximum 
amount of service charge that may be 
included in a contract or note regulated 
by the Act is two-thirds of one percent 
per month on the unpaid balance, if 
that balance is in excess of $1000. 
(See section 1805.1.) 
8. See 40 Cal. Ops. Atty. Gen. 232-
237. 
9. Section 1802.2 of the Unruh Act 
provides in part: .. 'services' means 
work, labor and services, for other than 
a commercial or business use, including 
services furnished in connec-
tion with the improvement of real prop-
erty . . . ," and section 1802.1 pro-
vides in part: .. 'goods' means tangible 
chattels bought for use primarily for 
personal, family or household purposes 
including goods which, at the 
time of sale or subsequently are to be 
so affixed to real property as to become 
a part of the real property whether or 
not severable therefrom 
The Act applies to all "retail install-
ment sales," which means: ". . . the 
sale of goods or furnishing of services 
by a retail seller to a retail buyer for a 
time sale price payable in installments." 
(Section 1802.5.) 
10. See 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 579 (trial 
court result), 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 581, 
and 69 Cal.2d 881, 887-889, 73 Cal. 
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est, the reasoning and result of the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court on this specific issue have been rendered moot 
by the addition of section 1801.4 to the act by the legislature 
in 1969.11 
Notwithstanding the fact that the specific kind of contract 
involved in Morgan v. Reasor is exempted from coverage un-
der the Unruh Act by section 1801.4, the effect of the Court's 
reasoning with respect to the close connection rule will ob-
viously apply to those contracts within the purview of the 
Unruh Act. Therefore, an examination of the contracts in-
volved in Morgan v. Reasor merits our attention. As pre-
viously indicated, when the Reasor contract was regarded 
within the Unruh Act, the trial court ruled that Midwest was 
entitled to recover the time-price differential provided in the 
note and contract accruing after June 2, 1966. On that date, 
Midwest, acting under court order, provided the buyers with 
a completed copy of the contract.12 Both the Court of Appeal 
and the State Supreme Court disapproved this portion of the 
trial court judgment on the ground that section 1812.7 pro-
vides that in the event the act is violated, the violator or a 
knowledgeable successor in interest "is barred from recovery 
of any time price differential or service charge . "13 
The buyers, as plaintiffs, were awarded attorneys' fees by 
the lower court, pursuant to the court's reading of section 
1811.1.14 The Court of Appeal held the attorneys' fees award 
Rptr. 398, 402-403, 447 P.2d 638, 642-
643 (1968). 
11. See Statutes 1969, Ch. 554, sec-
tion 1. The 1969 amendment provides 
that the Unruh Act shaH not apply to 
any contract for the construction, sale, 
or construction and sale of an "entire 
residence" or aH or part of a commer-
cial or industrial building [see section 
1801.4]. The second section to the 
bill, which added section 180 1.4 to the 
Act, reads: "This Act is intended to 
abrogate any contrary rule in Morgan v. 
Reasor Corp. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 398, 447 P.2d 638." (See Stat-
utes 1969, Ch. 554, section 2.) 
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12. See 69 Ca1.2d 881, 897, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 398,409, 447 P.2d 638, 649. 
13. See 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 583, 69 
Cal.2d 881, 897,73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 409, 
and 447 P.2d 638, 649. 
14. Section 1811.1 of the Unruh Act 
provides: "[R] easonable attorneys' fees 
and costs shaH be awarded to the pre-
vailing party in any action on a contract 
or installment account subject to the 
provisions of this chapter regardless of 
whether such action is initiated by the 
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to be error, reasoning that because the action was essentially 
one for declaratory relief to determine the applicability of the 
Act to the contract and note, there was no action "on a con-
tract" as required by section 1811.1.15 The State Supreme 
Court affirmed this portion of the trial court judgment on the 
basis that the phrase "on a contract" is to be liberally con-
strued in accordance with expressed legislative intent. The 
legislative purpose of section 1811.1, the Court noted, was 
to encourage attorneys to accept cases from buyers who had 
valid defenses and rights of action, but lacked private capital 
to pay the necessary attorneys' fees. 16 Since an action for 
declaratory relief is the only practical option available to a 
buyer who owes a number of installments that include a time-
price differential factor and that are to fall due in the future, 
the Court concluded that the legislature intended no limitation 
on the type of action covered by section 1811.1, so long as 
the subject matter of the litigation involved a contract to which 
the Act applied.17 
The Court of Appeal decided to reverse the trial court deci-
sion so that the lower court could take evidence on the ques-
tion of whether Midwest acquired the contract and note with 
knowledge of their noncompliance with the Act.1s The trial 
court had failed to consider this issue, which is clearly critical, 
since Midwest, as an assignee, would be barred by section 
1812.7 from recovering the time-price differential only if it 
had acquired the documents with knowledge that they violated 
provisions of the Act. 19 
The State Supreme Court held that the trial court decision 
need not be reversed for the taking of evidence on the issue 
15. 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 583 (1968). 
The Court announced its determina-
tion of the issue without the explicit 
reasoning upon which it is based. 
16. 69 Cal.2d 881, 896-897, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 398,408-409,447 P.2d 638, 648-
649. The Court quoted extensively 
from Appendix to the Journal of the 
Assembly (1959 Reg. Sess. Vol. 2, Re-
port of the Subcommittee on Lending 
and Fiscal Agencies, p. 23). 
462 
17. 69 Cal.2d 881, 897,73 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 409, 447 P.2d 638, 649. See also 
Golden West Credit Corporation v. 
Maury, 270 Cal. App.2d Supp. 913, 
75 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1969), discussed 
supra. 
18. 67 Cal. Rptr. 577, 582-583. 
19. See section 1812.7 of the Unruh 
Act, cited and quoted supra. 
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because Midwest, on the agreed facts of the case, had the requi-
site "knowledge"· required for the application of section 
1812.7.20 
On the point of Midwest's status in regard to section 1812.7, 
Justice Tobriner's opinion establishes a new criterion for the 
future application of the section. Specifically, the decision 
establishes that "constructive" knowledge is sufficient to con-
stitute "knowledge" under section 1812.7. Thus, when Mid-
west acquired the note and contract as two separate docu-
ments from the seller, the fact that the documents were sepa-
rate should have led it, according to the standard applicable 
to a "reasonable man," to inquire as to whether the note and 
contract had originally been contained in a single document. 
A cursory inquiry, in the Court's view, would then have re-
vealed to Midwest that the Unruh Act provisions requiring a 
"single document" had been violated. 1 
In adopting the theory of "constructive knowledge," the 
Court rejected an analogy offered by Midwest to the law of 
negotiable instruments, and sets forth an extremely significant 
judicial attitude as well as giving a clear indication of judicial 
intentions in the consumer financing field. This portion of the 
opinion merits careful study and consideration by all mem-
bers of the bar of this state. 
The Court first states that the implementation of the Act, 
with its avowed aim of protecting consumers from credit 
abuses, requires that the standards for "knowledge," as that 
word is used in section 1812.7, should not be established to 
be so stringent as to permit easy avoidance of the section's 
consequences by financiers who purchase the commercial 
paper generated by retail installment sales to consumers. The 
economic function of section 1812.7, and the consequences of 
its application in the case of a seller inclined to frequently vio-
late the Act, are then noted. Such a retailer will be forced to 
sell his commercial paper at a greater discount than a mer-
chant who steadfastly complies with the Act, since financing 
20. 69 Cal.2d 881, 889-893, 73 Cal. 1. 69 Cal.2d 881, 889, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 398, 403-406, 447 P.2d 638, 643- 398,403-404,447 P.2d 638, 643-644. 
646 (1968). 
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agencies will feel reluctant to buy commercial paper that con-
tains service charges that are unenforceable. This will, in 
turn, cause the frequently violating retailer to charge a higher 
price for his goods, and eventually customers will thereby be 
deterred from dealing with him.2 
Furthermore, the Court's liberal interpretation of the knowl-
edge requirement of section 1812.7 will properly allocate the 
financial loss arising from the unfair practices and credit 
abuses prohibited by the Act. The impact of such violations 
will, as a result of the Court's interpretation, be borne ". 
not by a few consumers unable to pass on the loss or in any 
way 'insure' against the effect of a harsh contract, but by the 
finance companies that buy large numbers of notes."3 The 
Court, in this regard, notes the obvious fact that consumer 
sales financiers are obviously better able to bear the loss of an 
occasional "bad deal" than are individual buyers. 
In connection with this discussion of the "knowledge" issue, 
the Court states: 
Finally, strict enforcement [of the Act] will give finance 
companies, with the knowledge and economic leverage 
required effectively to police against Unruh Act viola-
tions, an incentive to do SO.4 
Thus, the decision recognizes the great value in enlisting one 
of the most powerful and sophisticated elements in the private 
sector of the economy in the task of policing the marketplace 
and preventing consumer abuse. 
The Court recognized that its liberal interpretation of sec-
tion 1812.7 will have some adverse effect on the negotiability 
and free flow of commercial paper. However, the Court does 
2. 69 Cal.2d 881, 890, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 404, 447 P.2d 638, 644. 
3. 69 Cal.2d 881, 890, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 404, 447 P.2d 638, 644. Perhaps 
the Court's prediction in this regard is 
overly optimistic, for one might well 
have doubts as to the number of con-
sumers who will have the necessary 
knowledge and energy to enforce their 
rights under the Unruh Act against 
464 
finance companies holding their notes. 
In any event, the theory is quite sound, 
and the author's reservation on this 
point is based upon the lack of wide-
spread and effective consumer educa-
tion, a problem over which the court 
obviously has no control. 
4. 69 Cal.2d 881, 890, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 404, 447 P.2d 638, 644. 
CAL LAW 1970 22
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1970, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 15
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1970/iss1/15
Commercial Transactions 
not deem this a serious problem and notes that the negotiabil-
ity of consumer paper has previously been limited "without 
apparent ill effect" by statutes in a number of states, including 
California.5 The decision tellingly indorses the thought on 
this subject expressed by the Florida Supreme Court in Mutual 
Finance Company v. Martin. 6 This decision declared that if 
a limitation on negotiability in consumer paper worked an in-
creased burden on the finance companies, it would merely be 
a clear indication that the prior free negotiability of such 
paper had previously worked a corresponding injustice on re-
tail purchasers.7 
The Court notes that the rule announced in Popp v. Ex-
change Banks has been repealed for all intents and purposes 
by the legislature through the enactment of the 1967 amend-
ment to section 1804.2. Therefore, the Court rejected the 
reasoning of that case as a valid analogy in construing the 
word "knowledge" in section 1812.7.9 In keeping with the 
5. See 69 Cal.2d 881, 891, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 398, 404-405, 447 P.2d 638, 644-
645. Section 1804.2 of the Unruh Act, 
as amended by Statutes 1967, Ch. 1294, 
section 2, provides that an assignee of 
the seller's rights in a retail installment 
contract is subject to all claims and de-
fenses that the buyer might have against 
the seller arising out of the sale, not-
withstanding the existence of a cutoff 
clause in the sales contract. The as-
signee's liability in this regard is limited 
to the amount of the debt owing to the 
assignee at the time the defense is assert-
ed. However, this limitation will not 
affect a buyer's right to recoup service 
charges previously collected by a seller 
or his assignee on a contract that vio-
lates the Act, because section 1804.2 
provides an exception for the operation 
of section 1812.7. The subject of cut-
off clauses, which are enforceable in 
nonconsumer sales in California pur-
suant to Cal. Com. Code § 9206(1), is 
mentioned in the decision of James Tal-
cott, Inc. v. Gee, 266 Cal. App.2d 384, 
387, 72 Cal. Rptr. 168, 170-171 (1968). 
CAL LAW 1970 
6. 63 So.2d 649, 653, 44 A.L.R.2d 1 
(Fla., 1953). 
7. 69 Cal.2d 881, 891, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 404-405, 447 P.2d 638, 644-645 
(1968). 
8. 189 Cal. 296, 303; 208 P. 113 
(1922). The rule, as stated by the 
court, is that a holder in due course 
does not bear a duty to investigate sus-
picious circumstances when he acquires 
commercial paper. (69 Cal.2d 881, 
891, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 404-405, 447 
P.2d 638, 644-645.) 
9. The basis of the Popp rule, to wit, 
that a holder in due course of a nego-
tiable instrument does not lose his pre-
ferred position when he acquires the 
paper under suspicious circumstances if, 
in fact, he had no subjective knowledge 
of a defect in the transaction that pro-
duced the paper, is carried forward in 
the definition of "holder in due course" 
contained in Cal. Com. Code Section 
3302(1). (See Cal. Com. Code Com-
ment 2 to section 3302 and Cal. Com. 
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indications contained in the portion of the decision concerning 
the frequently violating seller, his financier, and section 
1812.7, the Court concludes its discussion of the "knowledge" 
issue with a statement that, in some situations, prior com-
plaints against a seller might provide the "needed suspicious 
circumstance" to charge the financier or purchaser of retail 
installment sales contracts with "knowledge" of facts that he 
would have learned if he had made inquiry.lo Thus, it is 
quite clear that the California Supreme Court intends to im-
pose liability for Unruh Act violations on financiers who con-
tinue to deal with retail sellers who have a history of non-
compliance with the Act. All financial institutions are clearly 
put on notice, direct and not constructive, of this significant 
event in California commercial law. 
D. Morgan v. Reasor and the Close Connection Rule 
The portion of the Morgan v. Reasor decision discussed 
above would establish the case as truly significant. However, 
a later portion of the opinion, clearly obiter dictum, over-
shadows the foregoing in its significance and potential. The 
Morgan decision will, in all likelihood, be principally remem-
should still be considered good law in 
nonconsumer paper situations. How-
ever, the Court's discussion of the his-
tory of the rule stated in Popp is quite 
disparaging, at least in the context of 
applying the rule by analogy to a point 
of law in the consumer finance field. 
(See footnote 16, 69 Cal.2d 881, 891-
892.) As noted in the body of this arti-
cle, Popp has no validity in regard to 
consumer commercial paper falling un-
der the provisions of section 1804.2. 
10. 69 Ca1.2d 881, 893, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 406, 447 P.2d 638, 646 (1968). 
The Court also mentions that "an un-
usually high discount rate" might also 
serve to give constructive notice of vio-
lations of the Unruh Act to the pur-
chaser of consumer commercial paper. 
Although the reference is ambiguous, it 
may be that what the Court had in mind 
466 
on this point is the situation in which a 
seller offers an extremely high discount 
rate to a prospective purchaser of his 
consumer commercial paper. However, 
a retail seller's desire to obtain a pur-
chaser of his commercial paper may be 
merely a function of his need for initial 
or added financing for new projects. 
Thus, his willingness to offer a high 
discount rate would be consistent with 
situations other than a continuing effort 
by the seller to violate the Unruh Act. 
It seems, therefore, that a high discount 
rate is an inappropriate fact, by itself, 
to put a reasonable man-financier on 
inquiry. Of course, a substantial number 
of prior complaints against a seller 
charging violations of the Act is clearly 
an acceptable fact on which to base the 
application of the "constructive knowl-
edge" doctrine. 
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bered because the Court chose this case as an opportunity to 
offer a discussion concerning the problem of the third-party 
financier who has a "close connection" with a sales transac-
tion. The Court's statements regarding this subject deserve 
the attention of all students of commercial law. 
Other courts have recognized the artificiality involved when 
distinguishing between a seller and his financier who buys 
the seller's commercial paper, if the financier has entered into 
a direct or close connection with the particular sales trans-
action that generates the commercial paper. Rather than give 
the financier in such situations the status of a holder in due 
course, who is free from defenses and rights of action that 
the buyer would have against the seller, courts have occa-
sionally treated the financier as a party to the original transac-
tion rather than a third-party holder in due course.ll The 
Court notes that the close connection rule, with the resultant 
denial of holder-in-due-course status to the third-party finan-
cier, was applied by it in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange 
County Machine Works, and states that the "gravamen" of the 
Commercial Credit case or rule is that the seller extends credit 
and accepts the buyer's note as, in essence, an agent for the 
financier.lll In support of this reading of its prior decision, the 
Court quotes a legislative committee report recommending 
passage of the Unruh Act that discusses the evolution of in-
stallment sales financing, starting with the original situation 
in which a businessman handled the entire credit sale transac-
tion himself without contemplating the transfer of the buyer's 
account receivable or promissory note to a third person. The 
report goes on to note that in present-day consumer financing, 
the seller generally has no intention of extending credit; but, 
in accordance with previous arrangements, the account re-
11. Commercial Credit Corp. v. 
Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 
2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950); Commer-
cial Credit Corp. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 
1073, 137 S.W.2d 260, 128 A.L.R. 726 
(1940); Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 
232 A.2d 405 (1967). 
12. Certainly a casual, or even close, 
reading of Commercial Credit would 
CAL LAW 1970 
not disclose that the Court in that de-
cision was consciously proceeding on 
an agency theory. However, as the 
Morgan v. Reasor decision notes, the 
reading that it gives to Commercial 
Credit has been "suggested by other 
courts." 69 Cal.2d 881, 894, 78 Cal. 
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.. 
ceivable or promissory note will be immediately sold to a 
financier. Is 
With the foregoing as an introduction, the Court chooses to 
take this opportunity to specify the standards that it will hence-
forth require for the application of the close connection rule. 
For that rule to apply, the buyer must show that the seller 
contemplated that the credit for the transaction would be ad-
vanced, and that the note would be held by the particular 
financier who did, in fact, eventually receive and hold the 
buyer's note. This proof, since it amounts to a "demonstra-
tion of ratification of an undisclosed agency," is suffcient to 
remove the shield of holder-in-due-course status from the 
financier since, as a principal with an agent directly involved 
in the sales transaction, the financier is on notice of all that 
occurs in connection with the transaction.a The Court then 
states that the agency theory, which it asserts was the basis 
for the close connection rule applied in the Commercial Credit 
decision, will apply to negate a financier's claims either to be 
a holder in due course or to be ignorant of violations of the 
Unruh Act in consumer sales situations. 
The Court concludes this startling dictum by stating that 
there is no adequate information in the fact situation before 
it to determine what the seller contemplated in regard to the 
eventual transfer of the buyers' note at the time of the sale.a 
The decision then notes the following circumstances that might 
give rise to an application of the close connection agency 
principle: if there has been a "substantial number" of previ-
13. 69 Cal.2d 881, 895,78 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 407-408, 447 P.2d 638, 647-648. 
The court quotes from Appendix to the 
Journal of the Assembly (1959 Reg. 
Sess. Vol. 2, Report of the Assembly 
Interim Committee on Finance and In-
surance, p. 14). The term "financier" 
as used in this article is generic and in-
cludes financial institutions as well as in-
dividuals. 
14. 69 Ca1.2d 881, 895, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 407-408, 447 P.2d 638, 647-648. 
15. 69 Cal.2d 881, 895, 78 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 407-408, 447 P.2d 638, 647-648. 
468 
However, in footnote 18 on page 893 
of the opinion, the Court notes that the 
fact that the paper was assigned to Mid-
west within a few weeks after its execu-
tion by the buyers, the fact that Mid-
west knew that the note and contract 
were executed simultaneously and arose 
out of the same transaction, and the 
fact that the seller left blank spaces in 
a contract for Midwest to complete, are 
items that suggest a close connection 
between the financier and seller in the 
case before it. 
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ous accounts receivable or promissory note purchases by a 
given financier from a given seller;16 if the financier's name 
appeared on the promissory note at the time it was executed 
by a buyer; if the financier has inquired into the buyer's credit 
rating;17 or if the commercial paper was assigned to the finan-
cier on the day it was executed by the buyer .1R 
The sweep of the close connection rule as announced by the 
Court will obviously include a vast percentage of all trans-
actions in which a seller transfers notes and accounts generat-
ed by retail installment sales to his financier. Certainly, once 
an arrangement has been entered into between a retailer and a 
particular financier calling for the transfer by the retailer of 
commercial paper generated by his sales, all future assign-
ments or transfers of such paper between the retailer and finan-
cier will come under the close connection rule. Thus, the 
"knowledge" requirement for the application of section 
1812.7, will be satisfied in the vast majority of consumer sales. 
It is also quite clear that since this portion of the opinion 
deals with principles contained in the general law of commer-
cial transactions and negotiable instruments, such as holder-
in-due-course status, the Court has effectively ended the 
viability of that concept in the vast bulk of nonconsumer sales 
financing transactions. 19 
Another aspect of the decision that might well be pondered 
by the commercial bar is the possible application of the 
Morgan close connection rule in third-party financed com-
mercial purchase transactions in which the buyer has signed 
an agreement containing a "cutoff" clause. It would appear 
that under the reasoning in Morgan, no true "assignment" 
takes place when the seller transfers his rights to a "con tem-
16. The Court notes this would be a 
factor that would "weigh heavily." (69 
CaI.2d 881, 896, 78 Cal. Rptr. 398, 
408, 447 P.2d 638, 648.) 
17. Presumably, prior to the seller 
entering into the sales contract. 
18. 69 Cal.2d 881, 896, 78 Cal. 
Rptr. 398, 408, 447 P.2d 638, 648 
(1968). 
CAL LAW 1970 
19. In this connection, it should be 
noted that the Commercial Credit Co. 
case, on which the Court relies so heav-
ily, involved the financing of a noncon-
sumer sale transaction. (See 34 Cal.2d 
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plated" third-party financier, because, in that situation, the 
seller is merely the agent of the financier. Thus, the scope of 
section 9206( I), and the validation of cutoff clauses contained 
therein, may well be restricted to those assignments of con-
tracts or accounts by commercial sellers to financiers who were 
not contemplated as assignees by the seller at the time of the 
sale. While section 9206 (1) is, pursuant to its terms, subject 
only to statutes that negate cutoff clauses in consumer goods 
purchases, the restrictive effect of the Morgan decision on the 
section's scope predicted in this article does not contradict the 
wording of the section or the intent of the legislature in passing 
it. The section specifically makes cutoff clauses enforceable 
by any assignee ". . . who takes his assignment for value, 
in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense. . ."-
under the Morgan reasoning, the financier, as the principal, 
has "notice" of claims or defenses to the same extent as his 
"agent," the seller. Thus, the specific wording of the section 
does not conflict with an application of the Morgan precedent 
in situations involving cutoff clauses and commercial sales 
transactions. Furthermore, the legislative history, which is 
extensively noted in the California Code Comment, discloses 
that the intention of the legislature in passing the section was 
to overrule the decision in American National Bank of San 
Francisco v. A. G. Sommerville, Inc.,20 which held cutoff 
clauses to be invalid as a matter of law. The legislature did 
not, as far as can be determined, consider the close connection 
rule, as originally stated in Commercial Credit, as being affect-
ed by the passage of section 9206 ( 1 ) .1 
One can argue with the statement in the Morgan decision 
that the Court is merely specifying the standards and clarifying 
the bases for the rule that it previously announced in the Com-
mercial Credit in 1950. In Commercial Credit, the court went 
to some pains to specify the application of the close connection 
rule in terms specifically related to the facts before it. 2 The 
20. 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376 (1923). 2. See 34 Cal.2d 766, 771, 214 P2d 
1. See Cal. Com. Code Comment 2 819, 822 (1950), at which the Court 
to section 9206. states the rule of the case as follows: 
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focus of the Court's opinion in that case was a transaction in 
which the financier "actively participated," and this feature of 
the transaction was stressed in the Court's decision. It would 
appear that "active participation" is a far different test for 
the application of the close connection rule than that an-
nounced in Morgan v. Reasor, i.e., did the seller "contemplate" 
that the note or account involved in the transaction would be 
transferred to a particular financier? Furthermore, by making 
it clear that the close connection rule, resting on an agency 
theory, will apply in cases involving issues other than the al-
leged holder in due course status of a third-party financier, 
the Court again goes well beyond its previous decision in Com-
mercial Credit. Whether adequately based in precedent or 
not, the close connection rule as enunciated in Morgan v. Rea-
sor Corp. will, it is safe to say, be of lasting and major im-
portance to commercial lawyers in the State of California. 
"When a finance company actively 
participates in a transaction of this type 
from its inception, counseling and aid-
ing the future vendor-payee, it cannot 
CAL LAW 1970 
'" 
be regarded as a holder in due course 
of a note given in the transaction and 
the defense of failure of consideration 
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